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Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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Assassination Records

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1 - 15 March 1962

PURPOSE

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (CIA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

I. * Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on antiregime attitudes, on potential resiststrengths of Communist security ance, and on vulnerabilities and system.

CONSIDERATIONS

agents. An area in which resistance has been reported second and third teams, dispatched in March, are exexpected by the end of March, while reports from the There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 of intelligence. First reports from first team are make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. pected to start in April.

for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled will be made to attempt such control. These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.

> 2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

3. 2 third-country trained inteltravel in Cuba for temporary ligence officers, readied to periods. Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

* Caribbean Admission Center, activated by 15 March 1962. Opa-Locka, Florida, fully

PURPOSE

operations, to identify and earmark in-To collect intelligence required for the and to provide security against Comtelligence assets as refugees arrive, munist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation


CONSIDERATIONS

and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at a new building completed and occupied, and with a


telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-As the operations develop, there will be both increased report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly intelligence collection and a need for as current an Innow governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be responsibility, with support of others as required.

mates, as required by progress 5, * Periodic intelligence estiof operations.


estimates can be considered at national To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current policy levels.



INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS we teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.



To collect intelligence.



team of gents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past one team of and experience.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

WALLEY BULLET ACT

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

PURPOSE

Establish 2 additional thirdcountry resident agents in Cuba.

selected and 50 agents trained. 9. By 31 March, have 105 agents

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

10.* Develop intelligence potential

Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of in the United States.

of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

against Communist agent operations. now seem possible in the continental atmosphere, at different levels than U.S., to spot additional intelligence To collect intelligence in a Latin assets and to provide security

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose controlling these factors. If the recruitment and train ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes

inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other and business interests provoke unusual personal ties able. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this

veyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with sup-= SABLE as in real ink lives local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with port by others as necessary. if possible, in Mexico

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 April 1962

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12.* Two teams of agents dis patched to Cuba. 13.5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. 15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

Possible use for communications and support.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

5. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

17. 3 legal resident agents in

1 - 15 May 1962

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

NW 54214 DocId:32977051 Page 5

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

ACTIVITY

One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers

(non-U.S.) resident in Havana.

19.



CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Four additional resident agents inside Cuba. 22.

of resident agents is to find a place where a trained as it can. The main factor of determining location CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba of Cuba as it can. Difficult

agent can stay viable.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much

To collect intelligence.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents. 24.

To ready agent operations.


Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS



To debase the economy of Cuba.

1 June - 31 July 1962

permig developed.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

and teams previously placed or Reinforce and resupply agents activated inside Cuba. 27.

possible.

By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

28.

29. * Collection of psychological material.

installations, and communica-* Survey airfields, military tion centers, 30.

* By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the 31.

To reinforce and resupply, as

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas

will be determined by developments of the previous

actions and by conditions.

To ready agent operations.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime. To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere. This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

government organizations, or to defect officials "in place. This requires attempts to place trained agents inside

Home marked by asteriek were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

1 June - 31 July 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

End of July 1962

To provide the Special Group (MSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

> report on attitudes and abilities of the popula-

tion inside Cuba.

* Comprehensive and definitive intelligence

32.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use military intervention.

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (State)

ACTIVITY

Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba. 2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.

Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.

PURPOSE

To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment this involvement process as necessary to achieve of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U. S. security interests.

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.

Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (Defense)

ACTIVITY

- After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.
- 2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.

PURPOSE

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

PHASE II (CIA)

ACTIVITY

Support U.S. military actions in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U.S. military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed planning. Executive responsibility for directand considered in the development of military ing the use of covert assets must be clearly commander of the U.S. intervention, as in understood as resting in the U.S. military agreed upon wartime operations.

To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

on Cuban revolt and inter-

Increase news emphasis

ACTIVITY

to help the Cuban movevention from the outside

ment.

PURPOSE

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATION MONGOOSE IN (USIA)

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (State)

ACTIVITY

political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the pleteness, as actions now being carried out by the and projects.

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (Defense)

ACTIVITY

Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (USLA)

ACTIVITY

Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemis-Propaganda programs to isolate phere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

produce but essentially the program is a continuaupon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material These activities will have some general impact for use as the Phase I intelligence operations tion of that already in effect.

*Teams
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TE	TEAMS*	3RD COUNTRY	3RD COUNTRY	LEGAL	AGENTS	AGENTS
31 May 1962	13	10+5 temp.Leg. Travlrs.	5in/2ready	30-5 temp.	155	85
31 July 1962	23 to 28	15	7	25	255	155
30 Sept. 1962	28 to 33	20	7	35	255	155 S/4
30 Nov. 1962	33 to 38	20	7	40	255	155
28 Feb. 1963	48 to 53	30	છ	50	255	155

*Teams
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			1.				
	28 Feb. 1963	30 Nov. 1962	30 Sept. 1962	31 July 1962	31 May 1962		
	48 to 53	33 to 38	28 to 33	23 to 28	13	TEAMS* INFILTRATED	
	30	20	20	15	10+5 temp.Leg. Travlrs.	3RD COUNTRY RES. AGENTS	
	9	7	7	7	5in/2ready	3RD COUNTRY STAFF IO'S	
	50	40	3	25	30-5 temp.	LEGAL TRAVELERS	
	255	255	255	255	155	AGENTS SELECTED	
·	155	155	155 Sky	155	. 83	AGENTS TRAINED	

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